Showing posts with label Heintzelman. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Heintzelman. Show all posts

Wednesday, March 21, 2012

The Left Behind

Wherein not every general is off to a new adventure
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On March 17, the Third Division of the Third Corps became the first part of the Army of the Potomac to load on transports and depart for a grand campaign to capture Richmond. The First Division, Third Corps was scheduled to follow it in just a few days, when the transports returned, and begin expanding the beachhead on the Virginia Peninsula so that Maj. General George McClellan could land his army of over 150,000 men--an army twice the size of the one Napoleon had commanded for his great victory at Austerlitz.

But it was more than just transports that delayed McClellan's relocation of his base of operations (the place from which an army in the field supplies and sustains itself). President Abraham Lincoln had dictated that McClellan could not make the move without guaranteeing the safety of the capital, and so McClellan had dispatched the corps commander he had the most confidence in to ensure the Confederates were really gone.

Alexander and Duffey's handiwork, March 1862. The former bridge over Bull Run on Warrenton Turnpike
The Confederate Army of the Potomac has abandoned their lines at Centreville with a rapidity that had surprised McClellan (as well as Jefferson Davis). On their way out they had systematically destroyed every bridge they could find to make them difficult to follow. Lt. Colonel Porter Alexander, though technically the ordnance chief for the army, used his engineering expertise to blow the stone bridge on the Warrenton Turnpike that Shanks Evans had done so much to defend in July 1861. Writing about it years later as Ambassador to Nicuragua, he recalled the work he and the similarly multi-talented George Duffey performed nostalgically:
I was directed to blow up the old Stone Bridge--an arch of about 20 feet--when all had crossed, & Maj. Duffey & I mined the abutments & loaded them, & then the major remained & fired the mines at the proper time. I have always wanted to revisit that spot, which was quite a pretty one in those days, but I never had the chance, though I went across Sudley Ford, only two or three miles off, in Sept. '62. I will probably never see it again, but if any of my kids, or kid's kids, ever travel that Warrenton Pike across Bull Run they may imagine Maj. Duffey & myself, on a raft underneath the bridge mining holes in the abutments, & loading them with 500 lbs. of gunpowder & fixing fuses on hanging planks to blow up both sides simultaneously.

Saturday, March 17, 2012

A Dazzling Spectacle

Wherein the first division leaves Alexandria for Fort Monroe
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"The morning of the 17th of March dawned bright and beautiful, with just enough coolness in the air to give vigor and make it a luxury to breathe the exhilarating atmosphere," the history of the 63rd Pennsylvania Infantry Regiment poetically recorded when it was published by their heirs over half a century after March 17, 1862. The log of their fellow Keystone Staters in the 3rd Pennsylvania Cavalry corroborates their memory, but with a somewhat more jaundiced take on the crisp spring weather of the DC metro area: "Weather changeable, grounds drying rapidly."

1860 property boundaries superimposed on modern street map
The 63rd Pennsylvania woke up that morning in Camp Johnston, on the property of George Mason, today the location of the Route 1 Chuck-E-Cheese's. Mason was from the the same clan that had bred the Father of the Bill of Rights (unfortunately, since they all seem to be named George, your intrepid blogger cannot identify the precise relationship), and was an ardent secessionist who hadn't fled with his family quite fast enough and consequently ended up under house arrest by Union cavalry. The Pennsylvanians had spent the winter there, helping to construct nearby Fort Lyon (on the heights of Huntington, very close to today's Metro station) and gleefully customizing the property of their unwilling host to fit their needs.

The 63rd was led by a Mexican War veteran, and regular Army captain, Alexander Hays, who had quickly been readmitted to, and then immediately granted leave from Andrew Porter's 16th Infantry Regiment to take up a colonelcy in the Pennsylvania militia. His father had been a congressman and Pennsylvania militia general and still had enough sway in Pennsylvania politics to get Governor Andrew Curtin to notice his son. He was also, like his men, from Allegheny County in West Pennsylvania, and so not part of the glut of Philadelphia-based Pennsylvania men that filled Washington in early 1862.

The 63rd joined several other West Pennsylvania regiments in the brigade of Brigadier General Charles Davis Jameson, a Maine native who had lost the 1860 election for governor, and became one of the many Democratic political generals in the Army of the Potomac. It's not clear whether Jameson was one of McClellan's hand-picked men, but considering he had led the 2nd Maine at Bull Run as part of a brigade that McClellan generally disliked it appears unlikely that he was.

Thursday, March 8, 2012

Not Much Choice Between Them

Wherein corps and cracks are formed
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After the Two Weeks That Changed The War the two Armies of the Potomac began moving. Ron over at All Not So Quiet Along the Potomac has done some great stuff about the Confederate preparation and subsequent departure from Northern Virginia, which I will not attempt to duplicate, so make sure you stop over and read it.



 On March 8, 1862, Abraham Lincoln and his new Secretary of War, Edwin Stanton, made a momentous decision--they would overrule McClellan's armies and establish four corps d'armee. French for "body of the army", the grouping of divisions in "corps" had been popularized by the phenomenal success of Napoleon. The units were designed to be armies fully capable of operating independently, but which worked in conjunction within the same theater. But since the 14 divisions of the Army of the Potomac were each larger than any American army previously in existence, the idea was anathema to many Northern leaders.

As usual, the general-in-chief, Maj. General George B. McClellan, lay at the center of what had become a controversial discussion fueled by the Joint Committee for the Conduct of the War. In McClellan's earliest days in Washington, he had stated his intention to form his army into corps. But as part of his systematic effort to remake the U.S. Army in his own image, he had held off on grouping the divisions into corps without explanation. In the meantime, the Joint Committee had caught corps fever, and on February 25 at 8:00 pm, had met with Lincoln in the White House to urge their creation. According to the Committee's report published in 1863:
They made known to the President that, having examined many of the highest military officers of the army, their statements of the necessity of dividing the great army of the Potomac into corps d'armie [sic] had impressed the committee with the belief that it was essential that such a division of that army should be made...The President observed that he had never considered the organization of this army into army corps so essential as the committee seemed to represent it to be; still he had long been in favor of such an organization. General McClellan, however, did not seem to think it so essential, though he had at times expressed himself as favorable to it. The committee informed the President that the Secretary of War had authorized them to say to him that he deemed such an organization necessary.

Friday, February 3, 2012

Masses of the Enemy

In which we reconnoiter Occoquan
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On February 3, Abraham Lincoln took the time to respond to his general-in-chief. Almost a week earlier the President had taken control of the war effort by issuing General Order No. 1, requiring all armies loyal to the Federal government to begin offensive movements. Maj. General George B. McClellan tried immediately to get Lincoln to countermand it, since the plan he was contemplated involved sailing his army down the Potomac, then up the Rappahannock and landing behind the Confederate position based at Centreville.

He would not be able to gather enough transport ships in that time period, though, which would make a plan supported by the Radical Republicans in Congress of a direct move towards Centreville the only plausible option. McClellan didn't like that plan because he believed the Confederates had too many men, that his own men weren't yet ready to fight, and because somebody else had thought of it. Lincoln was alright with the plan, and so issued Special Order No. 1, requiring the Army of the Potomac to seize Manassas Junction.

But McClellan kept working on Lincoln and on February 3, Lincoln signaled he might be persuadable.


Lincoln also included a separate memorandum with questions geared towards the other plan, one of the keys to which was crossing the Occoquan River near its mouth where the Confederates were thought to be weak, in order to keep them from forming a strong defensive line behind that river and its tributary, Bull Run, just as they had in July 1861.
Suppose the enemy in force shall dispute the crossing of the Occoquan? In view of this, might it not be safest for us to cross the Occoquan at Colchester rather than at the village of Occoquan? This would cost the enemy two miles more of travel to meet us, but would, on the contrary, leave us 2 miles farther from our ultimate destination.

Thursday, January 5, 2012

A Disloyal Man

Wherein the Joint Committee checks every Stone
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Fort Corcoran [Rosslyn] (Harper's Weekly)
January 5, 1862 was a Sunday, and in the town of Hancock, Maryland, a small force of Union troops under Brig. General Frederick Lander was receiving an ultimatum from Stonewall Jackson. Lander's men had been chased out of Bath the day before [today, in West Virginia, and primarily known by its unofficial name, Berkeley Springs]. Lander arrived during the day on January 5 and was told by Jackson that the town would be shelled if the Northerners didn't abandon it. With characteristic bravado, Lander told his envoy (Colonel Turner Ashby) to "bombard and be damned!... He will injure more of his friends than he will of the enemy, for this is a damned secesh place anyhow!" Lander then scribbled a more professional note for Ashby, and sent a message back to Washington for reinforcements. But the environment it would find in Washington was one that pointedly illustrates the differences between 1861 and 1862.

Lander was in charge of the Department of Harper's Ferry and Cumberland, located on the Maryland side of the Potomac River, between, not surprisingly, Cumberland and Harper's Ferry, but including a 30 mile patch of land on the southern side of the river (which, modified based on later military organizations, became the basis for that strange nub in the West Virginia panhandle, established in 1863). This little department had been established by Winfield Scott months earlier, because Lander pledged to be more aggressive than the Army of the Potomac's George McClellan and reopen the B&O Railroad to freight traffic, but he had been delayed in reaching his command. In the meantime, McClellan had succeeded Scott as general-in-chief of the U.S. Army and Lander's department had been added to the Army of the Potomac as a division (despite McClellan not countermanding the order that it was an independent command).

So Lander sent his request down the line to the next division commander, Maj. General Nathaniel P. Banks, in Frederick, Maryland. Banks, who heartily shared Lander's belief that an immediate offensive was needed to gain Winchester and control of the lower Shenandoah Valley as well as reopen the B&O, would have sent the request on down the line. Next in line was the division of Brig. General Charles P. Stone, headquartered in Poolesville (though the request probably would have taken the direct route from Frederick, through Gaithersburg and Rockville). Next were the divisions of Brig. Generals George McCall (the Pennsylvania Reserves) and W.F. "Baldy" Smith, placed on the Virginia side of the Potomac (in Langley and Lewinsville, respectively), completing the right-wing of the Army of the Potomac.

Saturday, December 17, 2011

Rec: I Expose My Neck. UGH!

My favorite things I read this week
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OLD SECESH. "While I cover my Neck, I expose my Feet, and if I cover my Feet, I expose my Neck. Ugh !"(Harper's Weekly)

Before proceeding to a heaping helping of recommendations, a report from a minor skirmish today in history:
Headquarters One hundred and fifth Pa. Vols.
Camp Jameson, Va
December 19, 1861

Sir: In obedience to your orders, I left this camp at 9 pm of the 18th instant with a force consisting of the regiment under my command, a squadron of the New Jersey Cavalry, under Captain Jones, and two sections of artillery, under Lieutenant Monroe, New Jersey Volunteers, and arrived at Potter's house within half a mile of the extreme outposts of our pickets on the right near 11:30 pm. I found that the pickets had been undisturbed, and immediately proceeded to distribute my force as would best support the pickets and preserve the force itself, should we be attacked. No demonstration was made by the enemy during the night. I left Potter's house for Pohick Church about three quarters of an hour after daybreak, having been detained that long in developing a movement to capture some of the enemy, but which proved abortive.

We arrived at Pohick about 9 am; was informed that the previous day the enemy had there a force of 200 cavalry and also a regiment of infantry concealed in the woods to the west of the village. Remained at Pohick about two hours; sent a party down the Telegraph road and discovered about a mile distant a rebel picket 6 or 8 strong; fired at them and they fled, but did not pursue as my instructions did not allow me to proceed beyond this point. Left Pohick Church between 11 and 12 am, and returned to camp at 3:30 pm. Came by the village of Accotink, and was there informed that no rebel forces had been in the village for over a month.

Respectfully submitted,
A.A. McKNIGHT,
Colonel, One hundred and fifth Regiment Pa. Vols.

Colonel Amos A. McKnight had led his small detachment out on a heavy patrol, because his division commander, Brig. Gen. Samuel P. Heintzelman, had suspected Confederate activity around the remains of Pohick Church (which his men had ransacked in November). McKnight had raised the men himself from around the Pittsburgh area in August, after completing his own service as Captain of Company I, 8th Pennsylvania, a 90-day unit that had not done much of anything under Robert Patterson while Joe Johnston sneaked off to help clobber McDowell at Bull Run.

McKnight would continue with the regiment into the spring, before being severely wounded and missing almost a year of fighting. He would return for two battles, before being killed at Chancellorsville.

***

Disunion managed two entire good articles this week. First, the most suspenseful read I've had in awhile, when an LSU professor recounts the story of two Tigers condemned to death. Then the story of "The Picket Guard", a forgotten poem whose popularity still influences us today, most famously through the English-language title of Erich Maria Remarque's famous war novel (oh, and also some blog out there).

Speaking of Ron, he covered one of those courts-martial that George Meade spent so much of November and December complaining about.

This week I featured some stories about the Confederate right, including the Aquia District, led by Theophilus Holmes. By coincidence, here's his resignation letter from the U.S. Army. People believe handwriting tells a lot about people. It's probably not true, but if it was, this would say all you need to know about ol' Theophilus.

The Atlantic had an interesting piece contrasting how the Civil War was remembered 50 years ago to today, called "Not Your Grandfather's Civil War Commemoration."


And introducing one of my new favorite blogs, which covered the Irish Brigade in Winter Quarters.

It was a good week for reading.

Thursday, October 20, 2011

Also This Week

An effort to not lose things
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When we study and relate history, we tend to do it backwards, starting with an event of significance, like Ball's Bluff, and working backwards to show how it came about. This gives the false impression that history is coherent, unlike the present. The present is a million strands of thread, that may or may not become story lines for future generations.

In the third week of October 1861, there was no indication what story would be told 150 years later. Stone's "slight demonstration" of October 20 was centered on Edward's Ferry, and not on Ball's Bluff, which was the sideshow of a sideshow (the main event, at the very least from Shanks Evans' perspective, being McCall's advance to Dranesville).

A similar, now utterly forgotten, reconnaissance was carried out by Israel Richardson towards Occoquan on October 18:



And in terms of other story lines for historians, October 20 included a letter to Beauregard from Jefferson Davis that proposed creating a Department of Northern Virginia for Joe Johnston to head, allowing Beauregard to again become sole commander of a subordinate Army of the Potomac (as long as he brigaded troops by states), an idea that would be a significant occurrence otherwise.



But on October 20, Charles Stone also decided to make a raid, and because of what happened the next day, that is the significant event of this one, 150 years ago.

Friday, October 7, 2011

After the Stampede

A boring day leading an army
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With history of warfare, it's easy to write about the fighting, the things before the fighting that led to it, and the things after that resulted from it. But real-time life in warfare is full of insignificant events that appear monumental, and significant events that go unnoticed. Both occurred in the first week of October.

"I have not written you since the few lines the day we expected to have a fight," Brig. General George Meade wrote to his wife on October 6 from his new camp in present-day McLean, referring to his last letter dashed off at 3:00 pm on September 30. "The stampede lasted for thirty-six hours." In his characteristic fashion, the mild cynic related to her the rumor going through the Union Army of the Potomac that its commander, Maj. General George McClellan, had planned a trap that would be slammed shut by the Pennsylvania Reserves, the informal name for the division to which Meade's brigade of four regiments belonged. "There is no doubt [the Confederates] were appraised of it, though McClellan asserts he did not tell even the generals who were to share in it till the very moment of action, and he is now convinced it is impossible to do or attempt anything without their knowing it."
At the present all is quiet, the enemy having withdrawn to his old lines at Manassas [Meade was off, they had only retired to Fairfax Court-House]. His threatening Washington was a bravado, hoping to draw McClellan out. Failing in this, he has fallen back, thinking we would rush after him, and thus give them a chance to get us at a disadvantage. They are, as Woodbury said, great on strategy, but I guess they will find after awhile that our movements are not to be governed by theirs, and that McClellan is not going to move until he is ready, and then not in the direction they want him.

Friday, September 16, 2011

By Command of Lieutenant-General Scott

Wherein the old boy gets his second wind
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View from Ft. Marcy, completed in late September 1861 by W.F. "Baldy" Smith's brigade


On September 16, George McClellan got an order transmitted by Lt. Colonel Edward Townsend, chief of staff for the general-in-chief of the U.S. Army, Winfield Scott.
The commanding general of the Army of the Potomac will cause the position, state, and number of troops under him to be reported at once to general headquarters, by divisions, brigades, and independent regiments or detachments, which general report will be followed by reports of new troops as they arrive, with the dispositions made of them, together with all the material changes which may take place in said army.
"By command of Lieutenant-General Scott," Townsend helpfully signed it, opting for a more military valediction than his typical "your obedient servant". Winfield Scott was at last striking back.

Almost since McClellan had arrived in Washington (and certainly since Scott had poo-pooed his intelligence that an attack by over 100,000 Confederates was imminent), the junior general had attempted to circumvent the elderly general-in-chief. He had decided that Scott had become too senile or too stuck in his ways to take the bold actions needed to save the Union. And Scott was affecting a cadre of senior officers from the old Army. Only by breaking the stranglehold of the same military leaders that had let the South secede, take Federal property, and win at Bull Run and Wilson's Creek, could McClellan save the Union.

Wednesday, August 31, 2011

Chance (Or A Good Friend) Has Placed Me In Command

In which feelings are hurt
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Sir:

I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of the Commission of brigadier General, which you are pleased to confer on me.

The opinion manifested by the Senate of the United States as to the incompatibility of the office of a Senator of the United States with the office of General compels me to decline the Commission. I do not feel myself at liberty to resign the position with which I am honored by the State of Oregon.

While nearly every man of even minor influence in the North and South was trying to get himself a commission in the growing armies, Senator Edward Baker was busy turning one down. True, he already held the rank of colonel in the lead of the 1st California Volunteer Regiment that he had dreamed up (recruited from New Yorkers and Philadelphians), and, as he observed in his letter of refusal to Lincoln "the government is pleased to allow me a command with my present rank", but everyone else around Washington was scrambling to command one of the divisions that Major General George McClellan was creating for his new, grand Army of the Potomac.

McClellan's first two picks for division command had been perfunctory, former commanders of the Departments of Northeastern Virginia and the Shenandoah, Irvin McDowell and Nathaniel P. Banks, respectively. Both had seen their commands folded into McClellan's new Army of the Potomac, so both had been given some compensation. But his next two picks, announced on August 28 and August 30, had been more surprising.

Sunday, July 31, 2011

Jockeying For Position

In which new stars appear and Hooker does what Hooker does
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Grade insignia (yellow indicates cavalry). Volunteers
and regular army wear the same insignia
Since the secession of South Carolina seven months before military men throughout the North had been attempting to get a high-ranking position in the war. While rank was equally important to Southerners, the North already had an army, making competition for leadership slots tougher than in the South (though no more vicious). Most of these men had been junior officers during the Mexican War, and some had acquired a taste for combat that no civilian pursuit could satisfy, while others saw the leaders of the Mexican War rise to fame and fortune based on their service (two became Presidents of the United States), and still others believed in the Union fervently enough to shed their blood for it. Most were motivated by a combination of some or all of these things.

In the aftermath of the defeat at Bull Run, the opportunities for high command became greater. The influx of three-year regiments and the determination to field a larger army around Washington created a higher demand for general officers, and the passage of a law establishing a corps of U.S. Volunteers (USV) to supplement the U.S. Army (USA) also allowed Lincoln to appoint as many officers as he needed. Starting on Wednesday, July 31, the floodgates of USV promotions opened as the White House finalized its consultations with the War Department and sent a large list of nominations to the Senate.

Thursday, July 21, 2011

12:30 pm: Reinforcing Henry Hill and the assault on Henry Hill

Matthew’s Hill
McDowell assumed Tyler had crossed the First Division at Stone Bridge, but couldn’t understand why he wasn’t making progress moving the Union line up Bull Run so that Henry Hill would be surrounded on three times. The answer, of course, was that Tyler had not crossed his whole division, only two of his three brigades, and the third was fruitlessly trying to find a down river ford that it could cross. And Tyler himself had quickly followed Sherman to the action and was now caught up in the scrum at the foot of Henry Hill.

Unaware of this McDowell sent a staffer to hurry Tyler up, then spurred his own horse to join Heintzelman down Sudley Road.

Henry Hill
Heintzelman’s division had been surprised, but was not discouraged and they were getting ready on the other side of Sudley Road to attack again.

Beauregard turned to Johnston and made a startling request – to leave the battlefield. After a hasty conversation, though, Johnston reluctantly agreed. Beauregard argued that the senior commander needed to arrange reinforcements and keep a battlefield-wide vision, while the junior could limit his focus to a specific sector.

Johnston first road to the closest brigade, that of Philip St. George Cocke. But Tyler’s negligence had unintentionally made it impossible for Cocke to go to Henry Hill without opening up the fords for the missing Northern brigade to cross. Johnston took a regiment, Eppa Hunton’s 8th Virginia, and directed it to Henry Hill, then took his staff to a nearby farmhouse called Portici to set up a headquarters.

Key to People and Places

2:00 am: Army of NE Va (US) delayed at Centreville

Warrenton Turnpike, East of Centreville

Burnside’s brigade was formed up and waiting in the dark on the Warrenton Turnpike [VA 29] outside Centreville. The Second Division commander, Colonel David Hunter, was waiting with him near the front of the men.

Behind the brigade, was the other Second Division brigade, under Colonel Andrew Porter, lead by the West Point Artillery under Captain Charles Griffin. Two of the guns from the battery had helped Colonel Charles P. Stone drench a Confederate officer in the Potomac during the Rockville Expedition. Today would be much more difficult.

Behind Porter’s brigade was the Third Division, under Colonel Sam Heintzelman, McDowell’s other trusted subordinate. They were three brigades strong, their last one still sprawled out to the east of Centreville.

In front of this column was not the three brigades of the First Division, but an accumulated mish-mash of that command. Daniel Tyler, responsible for Blackburn Ford two days earlier, was late and it was holding up the entire army.
 

Monday, July 18, 2011

Setting the Stage

Union guard at Centreville, 1861
Shortly before midnight, Brigadier General Milledge Bonham roused his brigade and prepared them to march from Centreville. By the first minutes of July 18, the weary men who had retreated from Fairfax Court House the night before were back on the road, marching down the Centreville Road (VA 28) to join the rest of their Confederate companions at a defensive position set on Bull Run.

Bonham's retreat was part of a consolidation of Confederate forces to defend Manassas Junction. That morning, Colonel Eppa Hunton's 8th Virginia Infantry abandoned Leesburg and began a three day march to join the army. Brigadier General Theophilus Holmes received orders to leave a minimal defense at Aquia Creek and join Beauregard as well. But together only a few thousand men would be added from these forces, the real coup was in the lower Shenandoah Valley, where the Union army under Major General Robert Patterson had inexplicably pulled back almost to the Potomac River the day before. Confederate Brigadier General Joesph E. Johnston took the opportunity to send his cavalry as close to Patterson as possible so as to block his scouts. With this screen in place, he began loading his infantry into box cars at Winchester for transport to Manassas Junction.

Sunday, July 17, 2011

The Manassas Campaign: Day Two

Fairfax Court-House in 1863, with Union soldiers posing.
"The general commanding the Army of the Potomac" sergeants throughout the Confederate army based on Manassas Junction read to the assembled men early on July 17, "Announces to his command that, at length, the enemy have advanced to subjugate a sovereign State, and to oppose upon a free people an odious government." The words were Brigadier General G.T. Beauregard's, and were contained in his General Orders No. 41 dictated to Assistant Adjutant General Thomas Jordan during the night to be read to the men at dawn. They referred to the march of the Federal government's army, the Army of Northeastern Virginia, which had marched from Alexandria County the previous afternoon.

The Confederate camps were a frenzy of excitement. At last, the Yankees were coming."Notwithstanding they're numerical superiority, they can be repelled," Beauregard boldly assured his men. "And the general commanding relies confidently on his command to do it, and to drive the invader back beyond his intrenched lines." This new found confidence in victory had to do with a decision made in Richmond in the early hours of the morning to order the Confederate Army of the Shenandoah under Brigadier General Joe Johnston in Winchester to load onto trains and move to Manassas Junction. Beauregard had been requesting the union of the two forces for over a month, to the great resistance of provisional President Jefferson Davis (not taking any chances, Beauregard went ahead and telegraphed Johnston himself to relay the news).

Saturday, July 16, 2011

Marching on Manassas

McDowell's map of Northern Virginia from July 1861 (LOC)
"McDowell marched on the afternoon of July 16th, the men carrying three days’ rations in their haversacks," recounted James B. Fry, the assistant adjutant general and chief of staff for the Army of Northeast Virginia. "Provision wagons were to follow from Alexandria the next day." As the top staffer for Brigadier General Irvin McDowell, leader of the army sent by the Federal Government to crush the rebels around Manassas Junction, Fry would barely have slept the night before as he ensured every one of the five division commanders perfectly understood how their men were to get to the rally point at Centreville.

"One day... we received our first order to march to a field of battle," remembered Francis Fiske, the lieutenant colonel (thus second in command) of the 2nd New Hampshire Infantry Regiment in Ambrose Burnside's brigade. Orders traveled from Fry who interpreted McDowell's will, to Second Division commander Colonel David Hunter, whose staff interpreted it into new orders suitable to get his two brigades moving. Those orders then reached Burnside and his Second Brigade, whose staff further refined them for the four regiments. One of these regiments was the 2nd New Hampshire, whose colonel, Gilman Marston, then had his staff further refine them for his companies (as a former Congressman, Marston probably had aides that were volunteers, but the poorer or less famous colonels wrote the next set of orders themselves). Lt. Colonel Fiske received the orders with the company commanders and other officers of his regiment.